February, 2010

Truth Behind Bars: Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S. Custody

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COLOMBIAN PARAMILITARY LEADERS IN U.S. CUSTODY

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International Human Rights Law Clinic
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, William Brownfield, announced the extradition to the United States of fourteen leaders of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC), to face drug charges. These paramilitary leaders are implicated in terrorizing and killing thousands of innocent civilians. As part of their efforts to seize control of territory and drug routes, paramilitary leaders targeted trade unionists and other members of civil society who they perceived as threats. Ambassador Brownfield pledged that the transfer of these individuals to the United States would not interfere with Colombia’s efforts to hold paramilitaries accountable for mass atrocities in Colombia. Thirty former members of the AUC (Defendants) are currently in U.S. custody.

Despite U.S. stated goals, review of available data indicates that the extraditions of paramilitary leaders have had adverse consequences for U.S. foreign policy by undermining rule of law in Colombia. The extraditions have (1) substantially diminished Defendants’ cooperation with ongoing human rights and corruption investigations in Colombia; (2) severely curtailed access to remedies for Colombian victims; and (3) undermined U.S. counternarcotics efforts by prompting a ruling by Colombia’s Supreme Court to block future extraditions of demobilized paramilitaries to the United States.

The United States should reform its policies and practices regarding criminal prosecutions of extradited Colombian paramilitaries to better support U.S. foreign policy interests by promoting Defendants’ cooperation with Colombian law enforcement. Active U.S. support of Colombian accountability measures will (1) strengthen the rule of law in Colombia; (2) address unsolved murders of Colombian trade unionists, an obstacle to securing a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement; and (3) align U.S. foreign policy with international law.

WE RECOMMEND THAT THE UNITED STATES:

» Create an effective and efficient procedure for judicial cooperation. The United States should establish a procedure that provides timely, consistent, and reliable access by Colombian prosecutors, judges, and victims to extradited paramilitary commanders. This procedure should also ensure that information obtained by U.S. law enforcement from extradited paramilitaries is shared with Colombian judicial authorities.

» Incentivize extradited paramilitary leaders to disclose details about all their crimes and the identities of their accomplices in the military, government and national and foreign businesses. The United States should actively encourage extradited leaders to testify about their crimes and allies by conditioning sentence reductions or other benefits achieved through plea-bargaining on effective cooperation. Possible benefits of cooperation should include provision of visas to family members of Defendants under threat in Colombia.

» Initiate investigations for torture committed by extradited paramilitary leaders. The United States should hold extradited leaders accountable for all their crimes under federal law, including torture, and promote justice for Colombian victims. Torture prosecutions will also provide additional incentives for Defendants to cooperate with Colombian and U.S. authorities.
Colombian Paramilitary Commanders in U.S. Custody

» Hernán Giraldo Serna was the commander of several paramilitary blocs and was one of Colombia’s top five cocaine traffickers. Giraldo Serna has confessed to murdering several public officials. He is linked to hundreds of murders and is accused of ordering the forced disappearances of four government investigators and raping nineteen women, including girls as young as twelve years old.

» Carlos Jiménez-Naranjo, a high-ranking leader of the AUC, was the commander of the 7,000 members of the Central Bolivar Bloc. During testimony in Colombia, he admitted to 578 violent crimes, including over 450 murders. More than 16,000 people have registered as victims of crimes committed by his troops. He was involved in the murder of Carlos Castaño, former head of the AUC, and is accused of plotting to kill more than 6,000 demobilized paramilitaries.

» Salvatore Mancuso Gómez was “one of the most powerful members of the AUC leadership.” Mancuso planned and executed several of Colombia’s bloodiest massacres, including the 1997 torture and massacre of fifty residents of the town of Mapiripán. Mancuso has confessed to 477 crimes involving 881 victims, including murders, forced disappearances, forced recruitment of minors and forced displacements.

» Diego Murillo Bejarano served as the “de facto leader” of the AUC. He has confessed to involvement in several massacres and has implicated Colombian security forces in human rights atrocities. Over 11,300 individuals have registered as victims of his troops. In January 2008, a Colombian court convicted him of forcibly disappearing at least sixty-seven residents of the provincial capital, Medellin, including children as young as thirteen years old.

» Guillermo Pérez Alzate was the commander of the approximately 700 combatants of the Libertadores del Sur Bloc which operated in the coca-growing zones. He has confessed to 120 murders and admitted to forcibly recruiting minors. Approximately 1,660 individuals have registered as victims of his troops.

» Rodrigo Tovar Pupo was the commander of the 4,500 members of the AUC’s Norte Bloc. Government investigators have linked his troops to 768 forced disappearances and 200 massacres. He has confessed to over 600 crimes, including forcibly disappearing seven government investigators and killing forty fishermen. Tovar-Pupo oversaw a campaign to exterminate union leaders in Northern Colombia.

» Ramiro Vanoy Ramirez was the commander of the 2,700 fighters of the Mineros Bloc. He has confessed to participating in 235 homicides and was accused of several murders, kidnappings, and forced recruitment of minors by Colombian prosecutors. Approximately 3,522 people have registered as victims of his troops.

» Hebert Veloza García commanded the AUC Calima and Bananero Blocs, responsible for over 1,200 victims. Veloza confessed to ordering massacres, personally killing more than 100 people, and participating in thousands of other crimes including forced displacements.

Introduction

On May 13, 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, William Brownfield, announced the extradition to the United States of fourteen leaders of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC) to face drug charges. In total, thirty former paramilitaries (Defendants), including most of the AUC’s top commanders, are in U.S. custody in Florida, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Washington D.C. The AUC, formed from paramilitary groups created in the 1980s to fight left-wing guerillas, has become a powerful network of Colombian drug traffickers and warlords. Over the last thirty years, AUC members are alleged to have massacred, forcibly disappeared, tortured, and raped thousands of civilians. By 2002, at the height of paramilitary violence in Colombia, the United States estimated that the group carried out approximately seventy percent of the killings and forced disappearances in that country.

At a press conference announcing the May 2008 extraditions, Ambassador Brownfield pledged that the transfer of Defendants to
the United States would not interfere with Colombia’s efforts to hold paramilitaries accountable for their crimes in Colombia. The United States will “facilitate all access, all of the information, and all of the opportunities to the [Colombian] victims, the victims’ representatives and to the [Colombian] prosecutors,” stated the ambassador. Three years earlier, in 2005, Colombia’s Congress approved Law 975, also known as the ‘Justice and Peace Law,’ which offered leniency and public benefits to paramilitary members in exchange for an agreement to disarm, forfeit assets, and tell the truth about human rights abuses they committed. All of the extradited AUC leaders were participants in the Justice and Peace program, and had begun to disclose details about their crimes and the identities of their accomplices. They gave details about AUC responsibility for crimes against civilians as well as its role in rigging Colombian elections. Defendants’ disclosures created an opportunity to dismantle paramilitary networks by prompting domestic investigations into AUC crimes and the criminal investigation of elected officials.

However, since their extraditions, the paramilitary leaders’ cooperation with Colombian investigators effectively has ceased. Logistical difficulties have been compounded by the absence of a written agreement between the U.S. and Colombia to coordinate judicial cooperation. Colombian prosecutors and judges face limited access to Defendants in U.S. custody. U.S. prosecutors also have rejected the efforts of Colombian victims to intervene in U.S. prosecutions to compel AUC Defendants to divulge information about their crimes.

Further, the plea agreements that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has reached with thirteen of the extradited Defendants do not contain incentives for Defendants to cooperate with Colombian law enforcement or to reveal the details of their human rights crimes. Eight Defendants have been sentenced to terms ranging from four to thirty-one years for drug-related crimes. The potential for AUC Defendants to help obtain convictions of corrupt Colombian politicians, dismantle drug trafficking networks, and reform the Colombian military is diminishing.

In light of these developments, the International Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRCLC) evaluated the consequences of extradition of the AUC leaders from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy interests. The specific goals of this report are:

1. To identify the impact of extraditions on Colombia’s on-going human rights and corruption investigations;
2. To evaluate U.S. foreign policy interests in promoting the cooperation of extradited Colombian paramilitaries with Colombian law enforcement; and
3. To make policy recommendations to better utilize the U.S. prosecutions of Colombian paramilitary leaders to advance U.S. foreign policy interests in Colombia.

In preparation of this report, we consulted primary documents, including U.S. court records regarding the extradited Defendants, Department of State reports on human rights conditions in Colombia, and testimony from current and former U.S. officials regarding Colombia as well as the U.S. interests in promoting the rule of law there. We also reviewed documents released by Colombian government agencies, including the Attorney General’s Office, the High Commissioner for Peace, and the National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation. International legal materials were also consulted. In addition, we reviewed secondary sources including newspaper accounts from U.S. and Colombian outlets, as well as documentation compiled by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups in Colombia.

Our analysis is limited by the availability of U.S. and Colombian court documents. The complete case records of U.S. prosecutions of eighteen extradited AUC leaders are not publicly accessible. Thus we were unable to verify the current legal status of each of the cases against AUC leaders including whether a Defendant has reached a plea agreement. Similarly, official transcripts of the statements by Defendants...
before proceedings conducted under the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia are not publicly available. However, Colombian newspapers published reports of these statements, which we consulted. Finally, the participation of some of the researchers in legal actions related to this report may have influenced the analysis. Every effort was made to minimize research bias by training researchers and by consulting multiple sources. The benefit of researcher involvement in some of the court proceedings against Defendants is a deeper understanding of the legal and factual issues involved.

Background

PARAMILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

The extradited Defendants include most of the former leaders of the AUC. In the 1980s, wealthy Colombian landowners created militias to wage a “dirty war” against left-wing guerilla groups and suspected sympathizers. Financed by the drug trade, the independent militias formed a national network in 1997, the AUC, to advance their common goals of controlling territory and drug trafficking routes. Often acting with the support or acquiescence of the Colombian military, the AUC used brutal and violent methods to wrest territory from guerilla control. AUC combatants forcibly displaced, disappeared, tortured, and killed thousands of campesinos, Afro-Colombians, indigenous persons, trade unionists, human rights advocates, religious leaders, and other civilians.

AUC commanders colluded with the political, military, and business sectors to ensure control of their areas of operation. In 2000, Human Rights Watch, a U.S.-based NGO, documented that half of Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units regularly collaborated in paramilitary activity. Military personnel directly participated in several high-profile massacres committed by paramilitary groups.

In exchange for political protection, Colombian officials used paramilitaries to intimidate citizens and secure votes. In the 2000s, several paramilitary leaders boasted that the AUC “controlled” thirty to thirty-five percent of the members of Colombia’s Congress. International and domestic businesses operating in Colombia have provided the AUC with financial backing and logistical support.

After the United States indicted several AUC commanders for drug-related crimes in 2002, paramilitary leaders announced a unilateral ceasefire and entered into talks with the Colombian government. These resulted in an agreement to demobilize AUC combatants. In 2005, Colombia’s Congress passed the Justice and Peace Law which established a legal framework for the demobilization of paramilitary members who had committed serious human rights abuses. The new law offered legal leniency and public benefits to any paramilitary member—from foot soldiers to the high command—in exchange for an agreement to disarm, forfeit assets, and tell the truth about human rights abuses they committed. If paramilitaries fulfilled the requirements of the Justice and Peace Law, they were eligible for sentences of five to eight years regardless of the severity of their crimes, or their rank or role in the AUC.

JUSTICE AND PEACE PROCESS

According to the Colombian government, approximately 31,000 paramilitary fighters had demobilized by 2006. Of these, 3,712 applied for benefits under the Justice and Peace Law. Applicants were required to provide information about the structure and hierarchy of their former organization, their rank and role, and to confess to their crimes. Victims of paramilitary violence were permitted to attend the hearings and pose questions to the perpetrators. The Colombian government reports that as of June 2009, more than 27,000 victims had attended 1,836 hearings.

At the time of their extraditions, all of the extradited paramilitary commanders were participating in the Justice and Peace process. Most were revealing details about their atrocities and the identity of their accomplices. (See text box)
the organization, Defendants had unparalleled knowledge of AUC’s ties to Colombian officials. The testimony of AUC commanders was particularly important because relatively few paramilitaries had come forward to divulge their crimes, let alone had the ability to reveal involvement of government officials as accomplices. The testimony of AUC commanders was particularly important because relatively few paramilitaries had come forward to divulge their crimes, let alone had the ability to reveal involvement of government officials as accomplices.62

The Justice and Peace hearings progressed in two stages. First, the applicant testified without restriction about his experience (referred to in Spanish as version libre). Second, state prosecutors had the opportunity to directly question paramilitary commanders about their crimes and could ask questions supplied by victims.63 Because Defendants’ extraditions came during the first stage of the process, the record of their crimes is partial and incomplete. Some Defendants disclosed information about their crimes, as well as details of military complicity and political corruption. Paramilitary commander Salvatore Mancuso, for example, used an eighty-seven-slide PowerPoint presentation to detail his role in killing 336 victims.64 However, most Defendants avoided testifying about certain categories of crimes, such as forced recruitment of child combatants, forced displacement, sexual violence, kidnapping, torture, voter intimidation, and smuggling.65

SUPREME COURT INVESTIGATIONS

Alongside the Justice and Peace process, Colombia’s Supreme Court is investigating paramilitaries’ alliances. The Supreme Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate sitting members of Colombia’s Congress,66 has initiated investigations of representatives accused of working with paramilitary groups to commit crimes ranging from electoral fraud to kidnapping and murder.67

The Supreme Court investigations were prompted in 2005, after AUC members made a series of statements to the media about the extent of the group’s influence on Colombia’s Congress.68 The investigations gained speed in 2006, after the discovery of a political pact signed in 2001 by paramilitary commanders and thirty-one politicians.69 Known as the parapolítica or paragate scandal, one third of Colombia’s congressional representatives have come under investigation for their ties to illegal armed groups.70 Of the 133 current and former members of Congress implicated in the investigations, Colombian authorities have subpoenaed seventy-one to testify and detained fifty.71 Nearly all the legislators under investigation are members of President Uribe’s governing coalition.72 Allegations of illegal conduct extend to the vice-president73 and even to the president.74

Defendants possess evidence crucial to these investigations. For example, files discovered on a laptop belonging to extradited AUC commander Rodrigo Tovar Pupo were used in the investigations of eighteen politicians.75 Yet the evidentiary value of extradited paramilitary testimony has not been fully exploited. Defendant Salvatore Mancuso is a potential witness in proceedings against twenty-six elected officials, however his extradition has limited his availability as a witness.76 Similarly, Defendant Carlos Jiménez Naranjo is suspected of having conspired with seventeen politicians but has only provided testimony relevant to one investigation.77

OTHER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

The Colombia Attorney General’s Office is prosecuting crimes committed by extradited paramilitaries as well as investigating ties between paramilitary groups and public officials. The Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Unit of the Attorney General’s Office and the criminal courts retain jurisdiction over criminal investigations begun before paramilitary leaders demobilized and entered into the Justice and Peace process. Defendants face multiple indictments and convictions in Colombia for serious human rights abuses including massacres, forced disappearances, and murders.78

Colombia’s Attorney General reports that prosecutors have opened 276 cases against public officials.79 The vast majority of these cases involves allegations of public officials conspiring with paramilitary groups (in a few cases to commit murder) and is in an early phase of investigation.80 The extradited AUC leaders are witnesses and accomplices in many of these cases.
Impacts of Extraditions on Colombia’s Accountability Measures

Review of available data indicates that the extraditions of Defendants have had several adverse consequences for Colombia’s accountability measures and victims’ rights. The primary effects include: (1) the participation of Defendants in the Justice and Peace process effectively has ceased; (2) access to remedies for Colombian victims has been severely curtailed; (3) the ability of Defendants to cooperate with ongoing Colombian corruption and human rights investigations has substantially diminished; and (4) Colombia’s Supreme Court has effectively blocked additional U.S. prosecutions of Colombian drug kingpins who are participating in the Justice and Peace process.

ADVERSE IMPACTS ON JUSTICE AND PEACE PROCESS

Only five of the thirty Defendants have continued their voluntary statements at the Justice and Peace hearings from the United States. Defendant Salvatore Mancuso participated in four version libre confession sessions from the United States, more than the other extradited leaders. During these sessions, he detailed several massacres and trade unionist murders. However, on September 30, 2009, Mancuso announced his decision to withdraw from the process. His announcement came three days after fellow extradited AUC leader Diego Murillo Bejarano made a similar announcement. In letters to Colombian authorities, both Defendants cited unexplained delays, the inability to confer with subordinates, and threats to family members in Colombia as the reasons for their decisions. Colombian authorities have confirmed the difficulties in securing the Defendants’ continued participation. Of thirty-nine hearing requests made by Colombian authorities during a five-month period, only ten were satisfied.

The risks to Defendants’ relatives in Colombia are exerting a chilling effect on Defendants’ cooperation. On October 16, 2008, Defendant Ramiro Vanoy Ramirez suspended his participation in the Justice and Peace process after four of his children were kidnapped and his nephew was killed. No additional confession sessions for Miguel Mejía Muñera and Guillermo Pérez-Alzate, the two Defendants who have not formally withdrawn, are scheduled.

As it stands, Defendants have little incentive to participate in the Justice and Peace process. The threat of extradition and the promise of reduced sentences in Colombia motivated their cooperation with the Justice and Peace process while they were in Colombia. These inducements are irrelevant in the United States where Defendants face prison terms for drug-related crimes. U.S. prosecutors have not incentivized the Defendants’ cooperation through plea agreements or by leveraging U.S. prosecutions for torture.

ADVERSE IMPACTS ON ACCESS TO REMEDIES FOR COLOMBIAN VICTIMS

The extraditions of Defendants have adversely impacted the Colombian victims of their crimes. To preserve victim involvement in the Justice and Peace process, Colombian and U.S. authorities initially planned for Defendants to testify via video conference for viewing by accredited victims in Colombia. In practice, however, Colombian authorities have cancelled several transmissions because of lack of funds. Similarly, U.S. custody of Defendants has frustrated victims’ ability to question perpetrators directly, as stipulated by the Justice and Peace Law.

The extraditions of Defendants have also restricted Colombian victims’ access to reparations. The Justice and Peace Law guarantees victims “quick and integral reparation” for the harms they have suffered. Toward that end, demobilized paramilitaries are required to turn over all illegal assets to the Victims Reparation Fund (Fund). Ambassador Brownfield stated: “[W]e want the maximum compensation, the maximum reparation that is possible for [paramilitary] victims.” The Defendants amassed great wealth through the drug trade and land stolen from rural peasants fleeing paramilitary violence. The extradition orders of paramilitary commanders established that the United States would seek to transfer
assets acquired from Defendants to the Fund.\textsuperscript{101} Although the United States has identified assets of twenty-one of the thirty Defendants, there is no indication U.S. officials have transferred any of these resources to Colombian victims.\textsuperscript{102} The Fund currently contains under $4 million in paramilitary assets\textsuperscript{103} to satisfy claims from more than 200,000 victims.\textsuperscript{104}

Further, Colombian victims have been unable to pursue economic redress against Defendants through the U.S. criminal proceedings. In theory, victims are eligible to collect compensation from Defendants and to inform the terms of a plea bargain and eventual sentence under the U.S. Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA).\textsuperscript{105} However, U.S. prosecutors have opposed the efforts of Colombian victims to intervene\textsuperscript{106} and have refused to acknowledge them as victims under the statute.\textsuperscript{107} This approach prevents victims from even learning of the status of the prosecutions of Defendants.\textsuperscript{108}

**ADVERSE IMPACTS ON COLOMBIAN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS**

Colombian investigations outside the Justice and Peace process have been stymied by the extradition of Defendants. At the direction of the United States, Colombia has forwarded all requests for judicial cooperation to the justice attaché at the U.S. Embassy.\textsuperscript{109} However, Colombian judges and prosecutors report that U.S. officials have not been sufficiently responsive. Transmission of information has been delayed and cancellations of exchanges are frequent.\textsuperscript{110} In a May 21, 2009 letter to a Colombian non-governmental organization, the Colombian Human Rights Unit identified fifty-four unanswered requests for judicial assistance.\textsuperscript{111} The list included several unanswered requests to depose Defendant Rodrigo Tovar Pupo which had been pending for ten months.\textsuperscript{112}

Colombia’s Supreme Court has encountered similar difficulties. For instance, since late 2008, the Supreme Court has made multiple requests to take statements from Defendants, including AUC leaders Carlos Jiménez Naranjo, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, and Diego Murillo Bejarano. However, as of October 28, 2009, U.S. authorities had not responded.\textsuperscript{113} On several occasions, Colombian Supreme Court magistrates have visited the United States to meet with U.S. officials and Defendants to collect information.\textsuperscript{114} In October 2009, Supreme Court president Augusto Ibañez led a delegation to the U.S. to meet with DOJ officials with the aim of improving judicial cooperation.\textsuperscript{115} Although the meeting took place eighteen months after the extradition of Defendants, Supreme Court Justice Ibañez described the meeting as a “preliminary” effort to improve cooperation in the future.\textsuperscript{116} No concrete agreement resulted from the meeting.

**ADVERSE IMPACTS ON FUTURE EXTRADITIONS TO THE UNITED STATES**

The impact of Defendants’ extraditions on the Justice and Peace process has resulted in the loss of a critical U.S. strategy for combating drug trafficking. On August 19, 2009, Colombia’s Supreme Court banned future extraditions of paramilitaries participating in the Justice and Peace process.

U.S. Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. has remarked: “[T]he best way to disrupt and dismantle a criminal organization is […] to locate and extradite, when appropriate, cartel leadership to the United States for prosecution.”\textsuperscript{117} The US-Colombian extradition relationship has been described by the United States as “one of the most successful in the world.”\textsuperscript{118} Since 2002, Colombia has extradited 789 narcotics traffickers and other criminals to the United States.\textsuperscript{119} However, in 2009 the Colombian Supreme Court found that the extraditions of AUC members in Justice and Peace adversely impacted “the rights of victims and the Colombian public” by leaving them “without the possibility of knowing the truth and obtaining reparation for the crimes committed by paramilitary groups.”\textsuperscript{120} The Court further reasoned that extradition would “violate Colombia’s international obligations to combat impunity with regard to crimes against humanity” and undermine victims’ rights.\textsuperscript{121} The Supreme Court concluded that individuals should complete their confessions in Colombia before being extradited to the United States.\textsuperscript{122}
The United States has indicted additional paramilitary combatants participating in the Justice and Peace process and requested their extradition. For example, Daniel and Freddy Rendón-Herrera, AUC leaders currently participating in the Justice and Peace Process, were indicted by the United States for narcotics importation conspiracy and material support to a terrorist group in April, 2009. In accordance with the 2009 ruling, Colombia’s Supreme Court is likely to deny these requests, effectively shutting down U.S. prosecutions of Colombian drug lords.

Policy Rationales for U.S. Support of Colombia’s Accountability Measures

It is in the United States’ interest to reform its policies and practices regarding its prosecutions of extradited Colombian warlords to better support Colombia’s accountability efforts. United States cooperation with Colombian investigations promotes U.S. foreign policy goals to improve accountability, strengthen the rule of law, and combat impunity in Colombia. In recent years, U.S. policymakers have worked with Colombia to improve protection and secure the rights of Colombia’s trade unionists. By promoting Defendants’ participation in Colombian proceedings, U.S. officials will also advance this goal. Additionally, by cooperating with on-going investigations in Colombia, U.S. prosecutors will further efforts to dismantle paramilitary networks engaged in the narcotics trade and have the opportunity to hold Defendants responsible for the full scope of their crimes under federal law. The United States should support accountability measures by providing Colombian judges and prosecutors access to extradited leaders and by incentivizing Defendants’ cooperation with Colombian investigations.

PROMOTING DEFENDANTS’ COOPERATION STRENGTHENS RULE OF LAW IN COLOMBIA

The centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia is the counter-narcotics initiative known as Plan Colombia. Under this assistance package, the United States has provided $7 billion in aid to Colombia since 2000, with a substantial portion dedicated to strengthening the rule of law and human rights. The United States has trained thousands of prosecutors, judges, criminal investigators, and forensic experts developed a specialized unit within the Attorney General’s office to investigate human rights abuses, and funded the Justice and Peace process. The United States conditions aid to Colombia on several human rights indicators, including the arrest and prosecution of paramilitary members and their accomplices.

The United States is at a critical juncture in its efforts to strengthen the rule of law in Colombia. Despite U.S. political and financial support to promote an independent judicial system capable of effectively combating narco-terrorism and corruption, Colombian judicial institutions remain vulnerable. With AUC leaders in custody, the United States should act in concert with Colombian authorities to disrupt drug trafficking networks, prevent future violence, and provide redress for past atrocities. Effective cooperation will signal the U.S. commitment to combat impunity at a time when Colombia’s oversight agencies are in urgent need of support.

U.S. investment in the Justice and Peace program is in jeopardy. After five years and receipt of substantial U.S. financing, the Justice and Peace process is stalled. Defendants effectively have abandoned the process and consequently frustrated efforts to identify accomplices and dismantle paramilitary networks. Justice and Peace courts have not issued a final conviction in a case. Paramilitary leaders have refused to turn over the bulk of their illegal assets as required. Moreover, while the extraditions may have ended the Defendants’ direct involvement in the drug trade, they did little to dismantle paramilitary structures responsible for drug-trafficking and pervasive violence. In 2008, the U.S. government estimated that ten percent (or 3,000) of demobilized paramilitaries had rejoined criminal groups. In June 2009, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, Philip Alston, stated that killings by
paramilitary groups “continue at a disturbingly high rate across the country…” with “an alarming level of impunity….”  

Corruption investigations in Colombia are also facing significant challenges and the United States should act to bolster Colombian corruption investigations. Lead investigators are threatened and criticized by government officials. Colombia’s intelligence agency, Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), is under investigation for systematically and illegally conducting surveillance of Supreme Court magistrates and prosecutors involved in parapolítica investigations. President Uribe has made several statements questioning the impartiality of Supreme Court magistrates investigating these cases, going so far as to accuse them of aiding and abetting “terrorism.” In 2008, the Uribe administration proposed to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to investigate sitting legislators, including cases involving collusion with paramilitary groups.

As it pledged at the time of the May 2008 extraditions, the United States should support Colombia’s accountability efforts by sharing information with Colombian authorities. Reinforcing the efforts of Colombian law enforcement officials to combat drug trafficking and corruption promotes U.S. interests in eradicating narco-trafficking. To assist their Colombian counterparts, U.S. prosecutors should provide incentives to Defendants to reveal details about their crimes, organizational structure, weaponry, finances, and accomplices in government, military, and business sectors to Colombian law enforcement. U.S. prosecutors are in the position to offer inducements including sentence reductions through plea deals, the threat of criminal prosecutions for torture committed in Colombia, and the offer of visas for threatened family members to relocate in the United States.

If the United States does not proactively take measures to incentivize cooperation, Colombian investigations will languish or fail and U.S. inaction will ultimately undermine the impact of the extraditions on paramilitary cartels. The DOJ has stated that “it has no position” on whether Defendants should respond to requests by Colombian authorities, effectively conceding that cooperation will not unduly burden U.S. prosecutions. Therefore the United States should take a proactive posture and promote Defendants’ cooperation with Colombia’s accountability measures to further U.S. interests in dismantling paramilitary cartels.

U.S. prosecutors should take advantage of existing arrangements to incentivize Defendants’ cooperation with accountability efforts. In several cases, Defendants are already providing assistance and information to U.S. authorities on drug prosecutions in exchange for sentence reductions. As part of these plea agreements, U.S. prosecutors should also require Defendants to reveal details about paramilitary atrocities. Former AUC commanders are uniquely able to provide information critical to on-going human rights and corruption investigations. Information gathered from high-ranking commanders in the United States, especially disclosures about alliances with public officials, should be used to support efforts by Colombian authorities to dismantle paramilitary networks.

PROMOTING DEFENDANTS’ COOPERATION ADVANCES THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF TRADE UNIONISTS

As part of its goal to secure a free trade agreement with Colombia, the United States has increased diplomatic pressure on its Latin American ally to “aggressively prosecute violence against trade unionists” and increase protection for labor leaders and human rights defenders. Colombia has the highest rate of trade unionist killings in the world. Since 1986, more than 2,700 unionists have been killed; the majority by paramilitary groups who have stigmatized union activists as guerrilla sympathizers and viewed union activity as a threat to their dominance. President Barack Obama concisely described the situation in 2008: “The history in Colombia right now is that labor leaders have been targeted for assassination on a fairly consistent basis and there have not been prosecutions.”

A recent increase in conviction rates for these cases is due in part to testimony provided by
demobilized paramilitaries who have identified perpetrators and provided details about their role in murdering trade unionists. Nevertheless, U.S. congressional representatives have urged the Colombian government to demonstrate greater and sustained progress. In a September 12, 2008 letter to President Uribe, U.S. Representative George Miller, Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor, stated that “impunity will persist unless the Government of Colombia does more to investigate and prosecute the ‘intellectual authors’ who ordered, planned, or paid for the low-level assassin to perpetuate the killing [of trade unionists].”

The current prosecutions against Colombian Defendants offer the United States a unique opportunity to break the cycle of impunity in cases of unionist murders. Intellectual authors of violence against unionists, including AUC leaders Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, Hebert Veloza García, and Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, are in U.S. custody. Colombian investigations have revealed that paramilitary groups did not act alone but conspired with public officials, including the former director of Colombia’s intelligence agency, to intimidate and murder trade unionists. Defendants possess information about these networks and the identities of public officials involved. U.S. prosecutors are able to offer Defendants incentives, including the threat of additional prosecutions for human rights violations, to disclose information to Colombian law enforcement about violence against trade unionists and any government officials implicated in such crimes. Resolving these unsolved murders will promote accountability for violence against Colombian trade unionists, a primary concern blocking a free trade agreement between the United States and Colombia.

U.S. POLICY ON COOPERATION WOULD FURTHER COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

On October 6, 2009, Lanny A. Breuer, the head of DOJ’s Criminal Division, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[b]ringing the perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian law violations to justice is a mission of immense importance.” The significance of this mission derives from the United States’ interests in signaling its commitment to rule of law and human rights, its treaty obligations and its moral obligation to victims.

U.S. policy toward extradited Defendants should be guided by these same considerations. In this instance, U.S. international obligations are informed by the international duty to extradite or prosecute perpetrators of gross violations of human rights. For example, pursuant to the U.N. Convention Against Torture, which the U.S. has ratified, the State Party in whose territory an alleged torturer is found has a duty to either extradite that individual, or to “submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” This duty is also supported by U.S. domestic anti-torture legislation.

In cases in which gross human rights violators are present in the jurisdiction of another State, the duty to extradite or prosecute implies a duty to cooperate among States to bring perpetrators to justice. In the present situation, the duty to extradite or prosecute should be understood as the duty on the part of the United States to cooperate with pre-existing Colombian efforts to investigate and prosecute human rights violations.

International law supports U.S. cooperation with Colombia because the U.S. has custody of individuals alleged to have committed serious violations against Colombian victims, including torture, extrajudicial killing, and forced disappearances. Consistent with international law, a U.S. policy of judicial cooperation should adopt the following priorities: (1) human rights prosecutions should take priority over other criminal prosecutions; (2) extraditions should not serve as a mechanism for facilitating or aiding impunity; (3) extraterritorial proceedings should not interfere with domestic human rights investigations or diminish the rights of victims; and (4) the United States and Colombia should establish an effective mechanism for judicial cooperation. Multilateral treaties on extradition and transnational criminal cooperation ratified
by both Colombia and the United States support these conclusions.\textsuperscript{159}

Finally, the duty to investigate and prosecute gross violations of human rights, as well as the corresponding duty to cooperate, is buttressed by the international obligations to protect the rights of victims to learn the truth about the abuses that occurred,\textsuperscript{160} and to provide victims access to justice and reparations for the violations they have suffered.\textsuperscript{161} In his testimony before the Senate, Breuer noted that the Department of Justice has “played a leading role in seeking justice for the victims of human rights violations and war crimes” for “well over six decades.”\textsuperscript{162} The United States should honor this tradition by effectively cooperating with Colombian accountability efforts, in accordance with its international obligations.

**Recommendations**

The U.S. government has a special interest in dismantling the paramilitary networks that have terrorized Colombia for three decades. It has recognized the danger posed by paramilitary groups to Colombia’s democracy and rule of law, and supported the investigation and prosecution of paramilitary members in Colombia. Yet more should be done in the United States, where paramilitary leaders are in custody, to promote rule of law in Colombia. In particular, the United States should

1. **Create an effective and efficient procedure for mutual judicial cooperation.** The United States should establish a procedure that provides timely, consistent, and reliable access by Colombian prosecutors, judges, and victims to extradited paramilitary commanders. In addition, this process should ensure that information obtained by U.S. law enforcement from extradited paramilitaries is shared with Colombian judicial officers. The United States should review current policy to identify the cause of delays in responding to requests for cooperation. New procedures should ensure that U.S. authorities share information with and respond to requests by Colombian authorities in a timely manner to minimize any impact of the extraditions on open investigations in Colombia. The United States should also explicitly agree to repatriate extradited leaders to Colombia once they complete their prison terms in the United States and to transfer seized assets to Colombia’s Victims Reparation Fund.

2. **Incentivize extradited paramilitary leaders to disclose details about their crimes and the identities of their accomplices in the military, government, and national and foreign businesses.** The United States should actively encourage extradited leaders to testify about their crimes by conditioning sentence reductions or other benefits achieved through plea agreements on disclosure of details about their human rights crimes in Colombia. Prosecutors also could condition the provision of visas to relocate family members under threat in Colombia to the United States in exchange for Defendants’ cooperation. The U.S. Department of Justice should reverse its current policy of taking “no position” on whether Defendants should cooperate with Colombian authorities.\textsuperscript{163} U.S. foreign policy interests lie in helping Colombia succeed in dismantling paramilitary cartels, prosecuting those responsible for trade unionist murders, and removing corrupt politicians and military officers. DOJ should use this opportunity to reinforce Colombia’s accountability measures through effective cooperation.

3. **Initiate investigations for torture committed by extradited paramilitary leaders.** The United States should hold extradited leaders accountable for all their crimes under federal law, including torture. The United States should play a leading role in seeking justice for victims of human rights violations and violations of humanitarian law by moving swiftly to initiate investigations and prosecutions for torture.\textsuperscript{164} The United States also should leverage the possibility of long prison terms for torture to incentivize extradited paramilitaries to testify about these crimes.
APPENDIX

CHART OF EXTRADICTED DEFENDANTS
(Defendants listed alphabetically by their first, last name)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defendant &amp; Case Name</th>
<th>Date of Extradition</th>
<th>Case Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jhon Eidelber Cano Correa, a/k/a “Flechas,” or “Santiago”</td>
<td>September 22, 2006</td>
<td>Pleased guilty on April 29, 2008. Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Bustamante, et al., Case #: 2:02-cr-01188-JS (E.D. New York (Brooklyn))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fredy Castillo Carrillo, a/k/a “Pinocho”</td>
<td>September 22, 2006</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Giraldo-Serna, et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-15 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Arturo Gamez Moreno, a/k/a “Jimmy”</td>
<td>September 1, 2008</td>
<td>Case records sealed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Figueroa et. al., Case #: 1:02-cr-00940-RPP (S.D. New York)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardo Gelves Castro, a/k/a “Diomedes” or “El Cantante”</td>
<td>March 24, 2009</td>
<td>Case records sealed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(case sealed) Case #: 07-cr-300 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nodier Giraldo Giraldo</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-7 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernán Giraldo Serna, a/k/a “El Patrón”</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-1 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Mauricio Gómez Luna</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-11 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huber Anibal Gómez Luna, a/k/a “El Mello Rico,” “Hector,” or “Repetido”</td>
<td>September 22, 2006</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Giraldo-Serna, et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-10 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant &amp; Case Name</td>
<td>Date of Extradition</td>
<td>Case Status</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Carlos Mario Jiménez Naranjo, a/k/a “Macaco”</strong></td>
<td><strong>May 7, 2008</strong></td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding in Washington D.C. is unavailable. The Defendant’s initial appearance in the Florida proceeding is scheduled on February 22, 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Naranjo, et al., Case #: 1:05-CR-00235-RMC (District Court of Columbia (Washington, D.C.))</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Naranjo, et al., Case #: 8:02-cr-00482-JDW-EAJ-1 (Middle District of Florida (Tampa))</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salvatore Mancuso Gómez</strong></td>
<td><strong>May 13, 2008</strong></td>
<td>All hearings and conferences terminated on November 3, 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Castano-Gil, et al., Case #: 1:02-cr-00388-ESH-2 (District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.))</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miguel Angel Mejía Muñera, a/k/a “El mellizo,” “Pablo Arauca,” or “El loco”</strong></td>
<td><strong>March 4, 2009</strong></td>
<td>Case records sealed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Mejía-Munera, et al., Case #: 1:00-cr-10171-WPD-1 (Southern District of Florida (Miami))</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, a/k/a “Don Berna”</strong></td>
<td><strong>May 13, 2008</strong></td>
<td>Plead guilty June 17, 2008. Sentenced to 375 months on April 22, 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Murillo-Bejarano, et al., Case #: 1:03-cr-01188-RMB-1 (Southern District of New York (Foley Square))</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alvaro Antonio Padilla Melendez, a/k/a “El Topo”</strong></td>
<td><strong>February 22, 2007</strong></td>
<td>Plea hearing took place on September 30, 2008. Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Vengoechea-Mendez et al., Case #: 1:05-cr-00341-RMU (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alvaro Padilla Redondo</strong></td>
<td><strong>February 23, 2007</strong></td>
<td>Plead guilty on May 28, 2008 in both proceedings and sentenced to 70 months (credited 48 months for time served) on September 28, 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Padilla-Redondo, Case #: 8:04-cr-00282-SDM-TGW (Middle District of Florida (Tampa))</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA v. Padilla-Redondo, CASE #: 8:07-cr-00528-SDM-TGW-1 (Middle District of Florida (Tampa))</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CHART OF EXTRADICTED DEFENDANTS (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defendant &amp; Case Name</th>
<th>Date of Extradition</th>
<th>Case Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guillermo Pérez Alzate, a/k/a “Pablo Sevillano” USA v. Perez-Alzate et al., Case #: 8:02-cr-00482-JDW-EAJ-1 (Middle District of Florida (Tampa))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Plead guilty on October 27, 2008 and sentenced to 210 months on August 17, 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norberto Quiroga Poveda, a/k/a “Cinco cinco,” “55,” “Beto” or “Beto Quiroga” (case name sealed) Case #: 07-cr-300 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td>March 18, 2009</td>
<td>Case records sealed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hector Ignacio Rodríguez Acevedo a/k/a “Nacho Rodríguez” USA v. Rodriguez-Acevedo, Case #: 1:05cr20443-PCH-1 (Southern District Florida (Miami))</td>
<td>February 14, 2007</td>
<td>Plead guilty on March 27, 2007 and sentenced to 50 months on June 18, 2007. Released on March 09, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diego Alberto Ruiz Arroyave USA v. Varela et al., Case #: 4:02-cr-00714-6 (Southern District of Texas (Houston))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Plead guilty October 6, 2008 and sentenced to 90 months on June 6, 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Carlos Ropero Diaz, a/k/a “Santos” USA v. Medina et al., Case #: 1:06-cr-00232-RCL (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td>December 3, 2008</td>
<td>Plead guilty on November 30, 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan Carlos Sierra Ramírez, a/k/a “El Tuso” USA v. Castano-Gil et al., Case #: 1:02-cr-00388-ESH-3 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>All hearings and conferences terminated November 3, 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Gregorio Terán Vásquez, a/k/a “El Pipon”</td>
<td>November 20, 2008</td>
<td>No information available about proceeding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant &amp; Case Name</td>
<td>Date of Extradition</td>
<td>Case Status</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodrigo <strong>Tovar</strong> Pupo, a/k/a “Jorge 40” &lt;br&gt;USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-9 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramiro <strong>Vanoy</strong> Ramirez, a/k/a “Cuco Vanoy” &lt;br&gt;USA v. Bernal-Madrigal, et al., Case #: 0:99-cr-06153-KMM-24 (Southern District of Florida (Ft. Lauderdale))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Pleased guilty on July 29, 2008 and sentenced to 293 months on October 9, 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduardo Enrique <strong>Vengoechea</strong> Mola &lt;br&gt;USA v. Giraldo-Serna et al., Case #: 1:04-cr-00114-RBW-16 (District of Columbia (Washington, DC))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Information about current status of proceeding is unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Javier <strong>Zuluaga</strong> Lindo, a/k/a “Gordo Lindo” &lt;br&gt;USA v. Bernal-Madrigal, et al., Case #: 0:99-cr-06153-KMM-24 (Southern District of Florida (Ft. Lauderdale))</td>
<td>May 13, 2008</td>
<td>Pleased guilty on July 29, 2008 and sentenced to 262 months on October 9, 2008.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 In 2001, the United States classified the AUC as a “narco-terrorist organization,” and indicted several of its leaders. See U.S. Dep’t of State, 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations (2001). The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency defines narco-terrorism as “a subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups, or associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities. Further, narco-terrorism may be characterized by the participation of groups or associated individuals in taxing, providing security for, or otherwise aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors in an effort to further, or fund, terrorist activities.” Drugs, Money and Terror (Apr. 24, 2002) (testimony of Axa Hutchinson, Adm’r of the Drug Enforcement Agency, before the House Intl Relations Comm).


9 La Paradoja de Macaco, supra note 8.


11 Gov’t’s Motion for Pretrial Detention & Proposed Order at 3, United States v. Castaño-Gil, No. 03-00388 (D.C. May 20, 2008).


14 Indictment at 3, No. 03-01188, United States v. Murillo-Bejarano (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2004).


17 Sentence of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, Feb. 6, 2008 (Juzgado Tercero Penal de Circuito Especializado de Medellín) [Third Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit of Medellín] (No. 2006-0241 (Fiscalía 2302)) (Colom.) (on file with authors) (sentencing the Defendant to 26 years for aggravated homicide, forced disappearance, forced displacement, and conspiracy to commit a crime); see also Instituto Popular de Capacitación, El Terror, Mecanismo de Dominación de ‘Don Berna’ [Terror, ‘Don Berna’s Mechanism of Domination], Semana, July 16, 2007, available at http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=105030.

18 JUAN CARLOS GARZÓN, Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (Colom.), Desmovilización del Bloque


21 Id.


31 See 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 1; Drugs, Money and Terror, supra note 1.

32 See Brownfield Press Conference, supra note 2.

33 Colombia has extradited eight AUC bloc commanders and the majority of the AUC’s ruling council to the U.S., including Hernán Giraldo Serna, Carlos Jiménez Naranjo, Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, Diego Murillo Bejarano, Guillermo Pérez Alzate, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, Ramiro Vanoy Ramirez, and Hebert Veleza García.

34 Beginning in 2006, Colombia began extraditing former AUC members to the United States to face charges of drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism. See Appendix for list of extradited AUC members.


36 Press release, Dept of Justice, Colombian Terrorists Arrested in Cocaine-for-Weapons Deal (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr110602.html (the AUC “is considered by international human rights groups and the U.S. Department of State to be responsible for 70% of the human rights violations in Colombia”).

37 Brownfield Press Conference, supra note 2.


39 See Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris [New Rainbow Corp.] (Colom.), Parapolítica: La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos [Parapolitics: The Route of Paramilitary Expansion and Political Deals] (2d ed. 2007) for

40 The International Human Rights Law Clinic (IHRLC) represents the family members of several victims disappeared and murdered by extradited paramilitary leaders in connection with Defendants’ drug conspiracies. In cooperation with co-counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, IHRLC has petitioned the Department of Justice (DOJ) to recognize Colombian victims’ statutory rights as crime victims under the U.S. Crime Victims’ Rights Act. The DOJ has refused victims’ participation, arguing that Colombian victims of paramilitary violence are not direct and proximate victims of extradited paramilitaries’ drug conspiracies. Gov’t’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Ms. Alba Ines Rendon Galvis’s Motion Pursuant to the Crime Victims Rights Act at 7, United States v. Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, No. 03-01188 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Gov’t’s Memorandum of Law]; Letter from Kenneth A. Blanco, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, to Roxanna Altholz, Assoc. Director, Int’l Human Rights Clinic, and Almudena Bernabeu, Int’l Attorney, Center for Justice & Accountability (Dec. 19, 2009) (on file with authors).


42 See Appendix.

43 See Appendix and infra text accompanying note 108.

44 See supra text accompanying note 40.


47 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Dep’t, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Colombia (2002), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm (stating that “[t]hroughout the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, to deprive guerrillas of civilian support and allow paramilitary forces to challenge the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) for control of narcotics cultivations and strategically important territories.”).


50 La ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos, supra note 39.


52 For example, in 2007, Chiquita Brands pleaded guilty in U.S. court to providing $1.7 million in payments to the AUC. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Chiquita Brands International Plead Guilty to Making Payments to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html. The Organization of American


54 Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito para Contribuir a la Paz de Colombia [Santa Fe de Ralito Agreement to Contribute to Peace in Colombia] (Colom.) (July 15, 2003), http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/web/acuerdos/jul_15_03.htm.


56 Id. at art. 29.


59 Victims have directly questioned Defendants during the confession sessions, often requesting information about the fate or the location of the remains of a loved one. See, e.g., Víctimas y verdugos cara a cara via satellite [Victims and Executioners Face To Face Via Satellite], Semana, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-online/victimas-verdugos-cara-cara-via-satelite/113997.asp.


61 Information about the status of each extradited paramilitary in the Justice and Peace process is available at a search engine located on the website of Colombia’s Attorney General, http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Versiones.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).


63 See the stages of the Justice and Peace process, Justice and Peace Law 975, Diario Oficial No. 45.980 (2005), available at http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/justiciapaz/Documentos/LEY_975_concordada.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). According to Article 17 of Law 975, the Justice and Peace Law requires voluntary testimony by defendants, questioning by prosecutors of the defendant, and the defendant’s commitment to forfeit asset for victims’ reparations. Id. at art. 17. Prosecutors then issue a factual indictment to which the defendant must plead guilty in order to qualify for benefits under the Justice and Peace Law. Id. at arts. 18 & 19. The Justice and Peace court then will assess reparation claims submitted by victims and whether the defendant has satisfied the requirements of Justice and Peace and is eligible for an alternate sentence, i.e. a prison term of 5 to 8 years. Id. at art. 29.


65 Breaking the Grip, supra note 39, at 37-39.

66 See Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 art. 235.3 (amended by Decree 1500, 2002).

67 See Obstáculos a la Aplicación de Justicia, supra note 45.


69 See Fue Mancuso y no De la Espriella quien reveló el

70 See list of Members of Congress being investigated, according to party affiliation, www.verdadabierta.com (search “Congresistas elegidos en el 2006 procesados por parapolítica”) Apr. 1, 2009.

71 Obstáculos a la Aplicación de Justicia, supra note 45, at 12-14.


75 See El Computador de ‘Jorge 40’ Puede Ser el Inicio de Un Nuevo Proceso 8.000 [‘Jorge 40’s Computer Could Be the Start of a New Process 8,000], SEMANA, Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=97456; Obstáculos a la Aplicación de Justicia, supra note 45. Hernán Giraldo Serna, Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, Diego Murillo Bejarano, Rodrigo Pérez Alzate, Juan Sierra Ramírez, Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, and Hebert Veloza García have all provided testimony in the parapolitics investigation as to their alliances with Colombian political figures. Obstáculos a la Aplicación de Justicia, supra note 45, at Appendix II.

76 See id. at Appendix II 16-17.

77 See id. at Appendix II 16, 27.

78 See, e.g., Sentence of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, Feb. 6, 2008 (JUZGADO TERCERO PENAL DE Circuito Especializado de Medellín) [Third Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit of Medellín] (No. 2006-0241 (Fiscalía 2302)) (Colom.) (on file with authors) (convincing Defendant to 26 years for aggravated homicide, forced disappearance, forced displacement, and conspiracy to commit a crime); Conviction of Hernán Giraldo Serna, Jan. 21, 2009 (JUZGADO PENAL DE Circuito Especializado de Santa Marta) [Criminal Court of the Specialized Circuit of Santa Marta] (RAD:47001-3107-001-2007-00068) (Colom.) (on file with authors) (convincing Defendant to 38.5 years for forced disappearance); Indictment of Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, May 20, 2008 (Fiscalía General Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario) [Attorney General’s Office National Unit of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law] (No. 784 C UDHI-DIH) (Colom.) (on file with authors) (accusing Defendant of homicide, aggravated kidnapping, conspiracy to commit a crime, and terrorism).

An Article in the March 17, 2009 Edition of El Tiempo, a daily newspaper in Bogota, Colombia, which was translated into English by Gustavo Gallón G. & Yukyan Lam., Colom., Comm’n of Jurists (Colom.), states: 


During a November 2008 deposition from the United States, Salvatore Mancuso was unable to answer several questions posed by victims for lack of access to his subordinates. See Solo Tres Jefes ‘Paras’, supra note 86. See also Juan Forero, As Colombian War Crimes Suspects Sit in U.S. Jails, Victims’ Kin Protest, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/03/AR2009100303001.html. The defense for Salvatore Mancuso also complained that U.S. officials confiscated documents Mancuso had prepared for a scheduled hearing, which resulted in the cancellation of one of the hearings. Actualización sobre la situación de los jefes paramilitares, supra note 86, at 4-5.

Letter from Mancuso Gómez, supra note 84; Letter from Murillo Bejarano, supra note 85.


95 See Actualización sobre la situación de los jefes paramilitares, supra note 86, at 4-5 (citing letter from Colombian court explaining the cancellation of hearing involving Salvatore Mancuso for lack of funds for transmission to Colombia from United States).


98 Id. at arts. 42, 54.


100 See Breaking the Grip, supra at note 39, at 3 (“paramilitaries and their cronies have acquired massive wealth and political influence, subverting democracy and the rule of law”). Minority Rights Group International notes that Colombian paramilitaries control 40% of the arable land in Colombia. MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INTERNATIONAL, WORLD DIRECTORY OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES—COLOMBIA (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4954ce5dc.html.


102 Twenty-one of the Defendants’ indictments include forfeiture allegations. The indictments of Diego Murillo Bejarano, Ramiro Vanyo Ramirez, and Francisco Zulugua Lindo do not include forfeiture allegations. We are unable to verify whether the indictments of Jaime Gamez Moreno, Gerardo Gelves Castro, Alvaro Padilla Redondo, Guillermo Pérez Alzate, Noberto Quiroga Poveda, and Jose Teran Vásquez include forfeiture allegations because we did not have access to the indictments.


104 CNRR-Versiones Libres Programadas, supra note 60.

105 Victims of paramilitary violence qualify as CVRA victims if they demonstrate that the harm suffered was the direct and proximate result of a Defendant's drug-trafficking conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2009). Victims, including the family members of an environmental activist assassinated by an extradited paramilitary leader for opposing coca-growing in his area of operation, have petitioned the Department of Justice to recognize their statutory rights as crime victims.

106 The CVRA was passed in 2004 to broaden the rights of crime victims by providing victims of a federal offense the rights to be notified of all public court proceedings, to be heard by the court before it accepts a plea or imposes a sentence, and to receive restitution. U.S. government guidelines for CVRA recognize that the statute may encompass non-U.S. citizen victims of crimes committed abroad that are being tried in U.S. courts. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf.

107 Blanco letter to Roxanna Altholz, supra note 40; Gov’t’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 40. Unless the DOJ policy is changed immediately, Colombian victims will lose their opportunity to participate in the proceedings. CVRA provides the possibility of intervention by victims, but a petition to re-open a plea or sentence must be filed within 14 days or it becomes invalid, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5)(B) (2009), thus victims must be recognized before further Defendants reach plea agreements or receive their sentences.

108 Public access to case records relating to the U.S. criminal proceedings of eighteen extradited paramilitaries has been restricted. As a rule, the public has access to criminal case records in the United States unless judges exercise the discretion to place information under seal. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978) (“the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case”). Without access to case records, Colombian victims are unable to verify the status of U.S. drug prosecutions including whether AUC leaders have reached plea deals with U.S. prosecutors. For example, Colombian newspapers report that Salvatore Mancuso has reached a plea deal with U.S. prosecutors. These reports are impossible to verify because case records about Mancuso’s U.S prosecution are not available to the public. See Mancuso Negoció Preacuerdo en Estados Unidos [Mancuso Negotiates Plea Deal in the United States], SEMANA, July 21, 2008, available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-on-line/mancuso-negocia-preacuerdo-estados-unidos/113822.aspx.

109 The procedures for transmitting official requests are governed by the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, an agreement that provides a framework for transnational cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Inter-American Conv’n. on Mutual Assistance in Crim. Matters, Apr. 14, 1996, O.A.S.T.S. No.
75. See also Letter from William R. Brownfield, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, U.S. Dept of State, to Carlos Huguit Sardi, Minister, Colombia’s Ministry of Interior and Justice (June 25, 2008) (on file with authors).


111 Letter from Sandra Jeanette Castro Ospina, Director, National Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Unit, to Gustavo Gallón Giraldo, Director, Com,” Comm’n of Jurists (May 21, 2009) (on file with authors).

112 Id.

113 Actualización sobre la situación de los jefes paramilitares, supra note 86, at 5-6.

114 Id. at 6.

115 Id.

116 Id.


121 Id. at 44. According to the Court, “recent experience” proves that extraditions “paralyze” the Justice and Peace process because extradited paramilitaries were unable to continue their confessions from the United States. Id. at 38.

122 Id. at 29, 38.


124 Beittel, supra note 72, at 20.


131 See supra text accompanying note 103. The AUC is estimated to control 40% of Colombia’s arable land. See World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Colombia, supra note 100.


134 Id. The “parapolítica” investigations resulted in the investigation of 133 former and current congressional representatives. OBLIGACIÓN DE LA APLICACIÓN DE JUSTICIA, supra note 45 at 4. There are also investigations into at least 253 additional public officials, including mayors, governors, and military officials for paramilitary ties. CLAUDIA LÓPEZ AND OSCAR SEVILLANO, CORPORACIÓN NUEVO ARCO IRIS, Balance político de la parapolítica 1 (2009), available at http://www.nuevoarcoiris.org.co/sac/files/arcanos/arcanos_14_diciembre_2008_files/arcanos_14_informe_parapolítica.pdf. These difficulties emerge just as investigations produce results and reveal the extent of paramilitary influence over state institutions. One key investigation led to the arrest of the head of DAS for supplying paramilitaries with names of unionists and human rights defenders to assassinate. El Fiscal Iguarán Acusa a Jorge Noguera [Prosecutor Iguarán Accuses Jorge...


137 Brownfield Press Conference, supra note 2 (“The prosecutors in the Justice Department will share their evidence and information with the prosecutors of the Republic of Colombia, allowing them the opportunity to examine, analyze, and decide on how they wish to proceed in accordance with the Justice and Peace Law.”).

138 One example of how incentives can work is the case of Defendant and former AUC commander Diego Murillo Bejarano. Weeks before Murillo was scheduled to be sentenced for drug related crimes in the United States, IHRCLC and co-counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, filed a request on behalf of a mother whose son was kidnapped and murdered by Murillo’s troops to afford her the statutory rights of crime victims. Gov’t’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Ms. Alba Ines Rendon Galvis’s Motion Pursuant to the Crime Victims Rights Act, United States v. Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, No. 03-01188 (S.D. N.Y. 2009). The judge denied the petition but postponed the sentencing for 45 days, over the objections of Colombia. States v. Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, No. 03-01188 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2007). Although the Defendants were extradited to face drug proceedings, the U.S. may bring additional charges with Colombia’s consent. Under the doctrine of specialty, “a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of a court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried . . . for the offense for which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992), quoting, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886). The circuit courts are split over whether a defendant has standing to claim the benefits of the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The question of whether a criminal defendant has standing to assert a violation of the doctrine of specialty has split the federal circuit courts of appeals”); United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The Circuits are split regarding whether an individual defendant has standing to raise the issue of a violation of the principle of specialty”).


140 U.S. federal law permits prosecutions of foreign nationals for acts of torture committed abroad. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A provides that “[w]hoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.” Torture is defined as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.” 28 U.S.C. § 2340(1). In 2008, DOJ successfully prosecuted a former commander of a Liberian paramilitary organization. He was sentenced to ninety-seven years for multiple acts of torture. United States v. Belfast, No. 06-20758, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 844508 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2007). Although the Defendants were extradited to face drug proceedings, the U.S. may bring additional charges with Colombia’s consent. Under the doctrine of specialty, “a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of a court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried . . . for the offense for which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992), quoting, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886). The circuit courts are split over whether a defendant has standing to claim the benefits of the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The question of whether a criminal defendant has standing to assert a violation of the doctrine of specialty has split the federal circuit courts of appeals”); United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The Circuits are split regarding whether an individual defendant has standing to raise the issue of a violation of the principle of specialty”).
924 F.2d 1289, 1300-1 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986). In this instance, the doctrine of specialty “exists only to the extent that the surrendering country wishes.” The Colombian government could consent to U.S. prosecutions for torture. See United States v. Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).

141 See, e.g., “The Government has made clear to the defendant's counsel that it has no position on whether the defendant should respond to the requests of the Colombian authorities. The Government has stated that, should the defendant choose to participate in any interviews with Colombian authorities, the Government (i) would not use any of his statements made in the interview in connection with the sentencing proceeding in this matter; and (ii) would not consider his interview as a basis for varying from any of the stipulations set forth in the plea agreement, or as cooperation with United States authorities under either U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).” Gov't's Memorandum of Law, supra note 40, at 8 (footnote 4).

142 See, e.g., Plea Agreement (Manuel Enrique Torregrosa Castro) at 4-8, USA v. Villarreal-Archila et al., No. 07-00019 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 2009); Plea Agreement (Miguel Villarreal Archila) at 4-8, USA v. Villarreal-Archila et al., No. 07-00019 (M.D.F.L. May 18, 2009).

143 U.S.-Colombia Relations, supra note 127. During the recent visit between Presidents Obama and Uribe, President Obama expressed the U.S.’s interest in cooperating with Colombia in ensuring protection of labor and civil rights leaders. Remarks by President Obama and President Uribe of Colombia (June 29, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-and-President-Uribe-of-Colombia-in-Joint-Press-Availability/.

144 See Statement of Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative-Designate, to the United States Senate Committee on Finance, Mar. 9, 2009 (stating “The President and I believe that our mission is not simply to increase American exports, as important as that is, but to ensure that the way we promote trade reflects our country’s values about economic progress and justice”); U.S.-Colombia Relations, supra note 127; and Anthony Faiola, U.S. to Toughten Its Stance On Trade, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/09/AR2009030901315.html. Congressional members of the Democratic Party have made addressing the violence against Colombian trade unionists a condition for a trade agreement. In a June 29, 2007 statement, Democratic leaders announced their opposition to the trade agreement: “There is widespread concern in Congress about the level of violence in Colombia, the impunity, the lack of investigations and prosecutions, and the role of the paramilitary.” They called on Colombia to demonstrate “concrete evidence of sustained results” before consideration of a trade agreement. Pelosi, Hoyer, Rangel, and Levin Statement on Trade (June 29, 2007), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/mi12_levin/FS062907.shtml.

145 Human Rights Watch Comments, supra note 72.


148 McFarland, supra note 145. Despite the uptick in convictions, approximately 95% of trade unionist murder cases remain unsolved. Human Rights Watch Comments, supra note 72.


150 See Breaking the Grip, supra note 39, at 37, 103-04. For example, in 2001, armed paramilitaries pulled over a municipal bus in rural Colombia. Two trade unionists were taken off the bus and later found murdered and left on the side of a road. The crimes were attributed to Rodrigo Tovar Pupo. ‘Jorge 40’ and ‘Tolima’ Accused of Assassinating Drummond Trade Unionists, SEMANA, Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-conflicto-armado/jorge-40-tolima-acusados-asesinato-sindicatales-drummond/119359.aspx.


153 Norms such as the prohibition of torture, extrajudicial killings, and forced disappearances are peremptory norms...
that are paramount for the maintenance of international order. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("...a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."). All nations share an interest to ensure that these norms are upheld. See M. Cherif Bassiouoni & Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty To Extradite or Prosecute in International Law 51-69 (1995).

154 United Nations, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 5 (2), U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) ("Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him [...]"); id. at art. 7 (1) ("The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.").


157 The Inter-American Court found in Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay that under the American Convention on Human Rights, States must collaborate with each other to eliminate impunity for human rights violations, "either by exercising their jurisdiction to apply their domestic law and international law to prosecute...or by collaborating with other States that do so or attempt to do so." Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, ¶ 131 (Sept. 22, 2006).

158 These principles are set forth in a compliance report by the Inter-American Court addressing the relationship between the Defendants in U.S. custody and Colombian law enforcement. See Mapiripán v. Colombia Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 40-41 (July 8, 2009).

159 The Montevideo Convention on Extradition establishes that extraditions of individuals who face trials in their country of origin should not move forward "until [the defendant’s] trial ends or his sentence is served." Montevideo Convention on Extradition art. 6, Jan. 25, 1935, 49 Stat. 3111, 165 L.N.T.S. 45. Another agreement to which both states are party, the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, provides the framework to implement the duty to cooperate in criminal prosecutions. The treaty obligates states to provide requested cooperation including assistance in taking of testimony, sequestration of property, delivery of judicial documents, and transmittal of information and evidence. Inter-American Conv’n. on Mutual Assistance in Crim. Matters, arts. 2, 7, Apr. 14, 1996, O.A.T.S. No. 75.

violations; the progress and results of investigations; and in the event of death or forced disappearance, the fate and whereabouts of the victims; and the identity of perpetrators. See generally ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the right to the truth, 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8, 2006).


162 No Safe Haven, supra note 151.

163 Gov’t’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 40, at 8 (footnote 4).

164 See No Safe Haven, supra note 151.

165 The information in this Appendix was gathered from available U.S. and Colombia court records regarding the extradited Defendants.
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank Michael Reed and Amanda Lyons at the International Center for Justice and Accountability; Yukyan Lam and Coner Carrigan at the Colombian Commission of Jurists; Leo Cunningham and Lee-Anne Mulholland at Wilson, Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; and Gimena Sanchez at the Washington Office on Latin America for their invaluable assistance in preparing this report. The authors also thank Dean Christopher Edley, Jr., for his commitment to clinical education and support of the project.

We are grateful to the individual donors to the International Human Rights Law Clinic without whom this work would not be possible. We also thank the Open Society Institute Latin America Program for their generous financial support for this project. Travel support for this project was provided by the Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation.